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Abstract
This Article gives an overview of the requirements that must be fulfilled before a Central and
Eastern European Country (”CEEC”) can truly claim to be willing and able to apply the acquis
communautaire in the field of competition law and policy and thus to be ready for full membership
in the European Union (”EU”).

INTRODUCING EU COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE: REQUIREMENTS IN THEORY
AND PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE
Frank Emmert *
INTRODUCTION
This Article gives an overview of the requirements that must
be fulfilled before a Central and Eastern European Country
("CEEC") can truly claim to be willing and able to apply the acquis communautairet in the field of competition law and policy2
and thus to be ready for full membership in the European
Union ("EU'.').3
Specifically, the Article discusses some of the practical
problems that appear in the context of adoption of the competi* Professor of Law and Director, Center for International and Comparative Law,
Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. Until 2002, Jean Monnet Professor of
European Union Law and Dean of the Law School at Concordia International University Estonia. Comments and suggestions with regard to this Article may be addressed to
femmert@iupui.edu.
1. The acquis communautaire is the body of written and unwritten rules and principles which represent the level of integration achieved in the EU to date. This includes
the various treaties between the Member States, the regulations, directives and other
acts adopted by the EU institutions, the case law of the European Court of Justice and
the Court of First Instance, and various other measures and documents. It has always
been a principle of the EU to maintain this acquis when negotiating with candidates for
membership, i.e., the EU does not open the existing structure and substantive rules for
renegotiation. On the problem of evolution of the acquis between application and admission of a new Member State, see Daniel D. Dobrovoljec & Katrin Nyman-Metcalf,
Enlargement of the European Union - A Regatta with Moving Goal Posts?, 3 EUR. J. L. REFORM

131 (2001).

2. The requirements in general have been spelled out in the Conclusions of the
European Council Meeting held June 1993 in Copenhagen, and have subsequently
been developed at the Council meetings in Corfu (June 1994), Essen (December 1994),
Cannes (June 1995), Florence (June 1996), and Berlin (March 1999). See, e.g., PUSHING
BACK THE BOUNDARIES -

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

(Mike Mannin ed., 1999); PHEDON NICOLAIDES & SYLVIA RAJA BOEAN, A GUIDE TO THE
ENLARGEMENT

OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION:

DETERMINANTS,

PROCESS, TIMING, NEGOTIA-

(1997).
3. Although this is technically not correct, "European Union" shall be used
throughout this Article, rather than "European Community." The author shares a
growing perception in academic circles that the two organizations overlap sufficiently
so that their distinction can nowadays be limited to the cases where it actually makes a
difference with respect to decision-making procedures, etc.
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tion acquis4 by candidate countries on their road towards membership. There are many scholarly publications dealing with EU
competition law and policy in great detail.5 There is also a growing body of literature on the competition laws of the various
CEECs.6 However, there is still very little written about the impact of EU competition law on the development of national
competition law in Central and Eastern Europe 7 and most of
what is written in this context deals with what may be called "the
law on the books." In virtually all candidate countries for EU
membership, the difficulty of writing new legislative acts that not
only conform to EU requirements but also pass national parliaments can be overcome with sufficient effort. These efforts
sometimes included more than a bit of plagiarism, when West4. A complete treatment of all parts of the competition acquis, including State aids
and the treatment of public enterprises would be beyond the scope of the present Article. Therefore, the focus of the analysis will be on Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"). See Consolidated version of the
Treaty establishing the European Community, arts. 81-82, O.J. C 325/33, at 64-65
(2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, at 93-94 (ex Articles 85 and 86) [hereinafter Consolidated EC
Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts,
Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending Treaty on
European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC
Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom
Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty). Occasional remarks will be
made about merger control.
5. The classic text in English is the book by CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION (Peter M. Roth et al. eds., 5th ed. 2001); see also
JONATHAN FAULL & ALl NIKPAY, THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION (1999); ULRICH IMMENGA
& ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER, EG-WETrBEWERBSRECHT KOMMENTAR (1997). Other useful volumes include D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAw (4th ed. 2003); ALiSONJONES &
B.E. SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAw: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS (2001); VALENTINE
KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (7th ed. 2000)
(providing student-friendly material).
6. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, ABA Section of Antitrust Law - Comments on Draft Bulgarian Antitrust Law, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 245 (1991); Ilona Nurmela, Euroopa Liiduja EV
konkurentsidigusest Rooma lepingu artiklite 85 ja 86 ning uue konkurentsiseaduse eelndu pdhjal,
JURIDicA 352-58 (1997); Mihdly Maczonkai, Harmonisationof Competition Law andJudicial
Practicein Hungary, in ON THE STATE OF THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESS - ENLARGEMENT
AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 108-23 (Ferenc Mddl ed., 1997); MARjo OJA, THE COMPETITION LAW OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (1999); John Clark, Competition Law and
Policy in the Baltics - A Progress Report, I OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL'Y 149 (1999).
7. For notable exceptions, see Phedon Nicolaides & James Mathis, European Community Competition Rules in the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: How to
EnsureEffective Enforcement, in 51 AUSSENWRTSCHAFT 485-512 (1996); Tadeusz Skoczny,
HarmonisingPolish Antimonopoly Law with EC Competition Rules, in I Y.B. OF POLISH EUR.
STUD. 89, 89-102 (1997).
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ern European laws were used as models.' They sometimes included more than a bit of blackmailing, when national parliaments were being warned that early membership might be jeopardized if a ministerial draft was scrutinized too carefully by
parliament, let alone amended!9 However, as can also be seen in
virtually every candidate country, the laws on the books are one
thing, and the practical application is quite another.
The present Article aims to spell out the application problem in more detail and to show ways and means of improving the
situation before and after accession. Those findings are based
on ten years of experience as a university professor, legislative
advisor, and private consultant, working with students, practicing
attorneys, judges, public prosecutors, and civil servants in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The essence of the analysis,
problems and suggested solutions, applies to all of these countries. However, there are obviously differences in detail and the
development has been uneven yet dynamic throughout. This
should be kept in mind whenever a particular problem does not
seem to concern one country or a particular solution does not
seem to fit in another. It would be beyond the scope of one
short article to seek to provide comprehensive analysis of the situation in any one CEEC, let alone a fair analysis of the general
situation in all CEECs.
The choice of competition law to illustrate the problems
with application of the law in CEECs was quite arbitrary. The
findings can be transferred quite easily into other areas of law,
such as environmental or consumer protection, commercial law,
8. Until not too long ago, it was common practice in Latvia to simply translate EU
directives into the Latvian language and then present them to the national parliament
for adoption. A simple look at Article 249 of the Consolidated EC Treaty should show
that such a practice is highly problematic because most directives are not - and are not
meant to be - sufficiently clear and precise to be applied directly.
9. Estonian parliamentarians have repeatedly assured me that they were regularly
confronted with draft legislation for the implementation of an EU directive with instructions that amendments cannot be done without making the draft incompatible
with EU requirements. Furthermore, the sheer quantity of such implementing legislation often left them less than two hours for three readings of a new piece of legislation
before the final vote was taken and the act entered into force. On the other hand, the
fact that the Polish Sejm sometimes acted more like a sovereign legislator and exercised
choices, some of which were not necessarily or clearly given to it by the EU directives,
caused some dissatisfaction about Poland's willingness to dutifully adopt the acquis communautaire.
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much of administrative law, etc. If anything, the area of competition law is less problematic from the legislative perspective because EU law exists largely in the form of directly applicable regulations. However, this same fact makes careful analysis of the
interface of EU and national law in the context of competition
law in practice very important. National actors will not be able
to hide behind inadequate national legislation. To say it differently: in the context of competition law, the liability for
breaches of EU law will bear more directly on the private sector
-

including the legal advisors of the larger undertakings -

and

less on the governments of the new Member States.
The analysis will begin with a review of obligations already
binding upon the candidate countries under the association
agreements with the EU concluded between 1993 and 1999.
Their performance to date can give some insight into the
problems yet to come when the full force of EU law becomes
applicable on day one of membership, i.e., on May 1, 2004, when
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia are scheduled to join.
I. OBLIGATIONS UPON CANDIDATE COUNTRIES PRIOR TO
ACCESSION IN THE FIELD OF EU
COMPETITION LAW
In the 1995 White Paper on the Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration
into the Internal Market of the Union,10 the European Commission listed all essential legislative measures to be adopted by the
candidate countries in order to fully implement the acquis communautaire. The White Paper also made suggestions as to the
priorities to be taken - "Stage I"-measures. In particular, it
pointed out basic rules that should be in place before more detailed legislation could be adopted.
The White Paper emphasized the importance of effective
competition policy as a foundation of a successful transition to a
market economy. Candidate countries were encouraged to harmonize their legislation to EU standards in four areas: the prohibition of cartels and anti-competitive agreements; merger con10. Commission of the European Communities, White Paper: Preparation of the
Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal
Market of the Union, COM (95) 163 Final (March 1995) [hereinafter White Paper].
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trol; State aids; and the behavior of (State) monopolies and enterprises with special and exclusive rights.
As such, the White Paper did not create any binding obligations for the CEECs. Nevertheless, candidate countries knew
that they would not be admitted into the EU unless they had
achieved "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,"'1 and "the existence of a functioning market economy,
as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and
market forces within the Union."' 2 Furthermore, membership
requires "the ability to take on the obligations of membership,
including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and
monetary union."' 3 The Commission never left any doubt that
the full implementation of the acquis communautaire, as outlined
in the White Paper and as developed since, would be required to
meet these targets.
Theoretically, this full implementation does not have to begin before day one of membership. However, it is also clear that
it will not suffice just to write the required laws into the books
and declare them applicable as of May 1, 2004. The criterion
applied by the Commission was whether or not the candidate
countries were "willing and able" to apply the acquis coMmunautaire. That ability was to be demonstrated in real life i.e., with a credible enforcement record - before the Commission issued a positive opinion. Thus, the candidate countries
had little choice other than to approximate their legislation to
EU standards already several years before their admission and to
show in practice that they were able to apply it as well.
The good news in this context is that the great majority of
EU law provides for perfectly sensible rules that the CEECs
would have been well advised to implement, even if they had no
intention of joining the EU in the foreseeable future. 4
11. See Presidency Conclusions from the Copenhagen European Council,June 2122, 1993, § 7(A)(iii), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement.new/euro
peancouncil/pdf/cop-en.pdf (June 1993).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. In the context of competition law, for example, research demonstrates "a robust positive relationship between effective competition policy implementation and expansion of more efficient private firms." MARK A. DUTZ & MARIA VAGLIASINDI, COMPETI
TION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES:

AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

(Eur. Bank Reconstruction & Dev., Working Paper No. 47, 1999). See also WENDY CAR-
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Several bilateral agreements between the various CEECs on
the one side and the EU on the other provided for additional or
more specific "requirements" in the field of competition to be
met by the CEECs even prior to their accession. Around the
time of the White Paper, all of the CEECs concluded agreements
on "free trade and trade-related matters" with the EU. 15 All of
these contained certain provisions dealing with competition.
Those provisions essentially foresaw the application of Articles
81 and 82,16 as well as merger law and other rules, in the interpretation given to them within the EU, to the bilateral trade
under the agreements. Bilateral "Cooperation Councils" were
given the task to adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of the competition provisions.1 7 Due to a three-year transition period, the trade agreements were by and large superseded
by more comprehensive bilateral association agreements between the EU on the one side and the individual candidate
countries on the other,"8 before they could develop significance
in practice.
The main instruments, which are currently still regulating
the relationship between the EU and the candidate countries of
Central and Eastern Europe in matters related to the "first pillar" are, therefore, the bilateral association agreements, comECONOMIES: EVIBank Reconstruction & Dev., Working Paper No. 63, 2001); Richard Lang & Sven Muller, Privatisation,Perception of Success and
Attitudes of Managers in the East German TransformationProcess, in ESTONIAN ECONOMY AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Birgitta Berg ed., 1997); Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European
Nations and the EU Waiting Room - Why Must the CentralEuropean Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union?, 23 BROOK. J. OF INT'L L. 351 (1997).
15. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 94/974/EC, O.J. L 373/1 (1994) (Estonia
Free Trade Agreement); Commission Decision No. 96/752/EC, O.J. L 344/1 (1996)
(Interim Agreement Slovenia). Prior to the trade agreements, the bilateral trade relations with some of the CEECs were already formalized as of 1992 in "Interim Agreements." See, e.g., O.J. L 116/2 (1992) (Hungary), O.J. L 114/2 (1992) (Poland).
16. Articles without further specification are Articles in the EC Treaty. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79.
17. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 94/974/EC, O.J. L 373, art. 32(3), at 1
(Agreement with Estonia), Council & Commission Decision No. 96/752 Euratom,
ECSC, EC, O.J. L 344, art. 33(3), at I [hereinafter Agreement with Slovenia].
18. See, e.g., Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of
the other part, art. 130, O.J. L 68/3, at 33-34 (1998) [hereinafter Europe Agreement
with Estonia]. The Europe Agreements were designed to "further develop[ ] and incorporate[ ] the essential provisions" and ultimately "replace the Agreements on Free
Trade and Trade-Related Matters." Id. art. 130, O.J. L 68/3, at 34 (1998).
LIN ET AL., COMPETITION AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE IN TRANSITION

DENCE FROM A CROSS-COUNTRY SURVEY (Eur.
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monly called "Europe Agreements."' 9 They will continue to be
the most relevant source of mutual obligations for Bulgaria and
Romania, which will not become members of the EU in 2004,
and probably will not for at least another five years. All of the
ten bilateral Europe Agreements contain similar provisions regarding competition law and policy. The respective articles are
similarly short, as in the earlier trade agreements and again refer
to the interpretation of Arts. 81 et seq. as established within the
EU. For example, the Europe Agreement between the EU and
Estonia provides in Article 63:
(1) The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of this Agreement, insofar as they may affect trade between the Community and Estonia: (i) all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices between undertakings which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition; (ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position in the territories of the Community or of
Estonia as a whole or in a substantial part thereof .... (2)
Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the
basis of criteria arising from the application of the rules of
Articles 85 (now Art. 81) [and] 86 (now Art. 82) of the Treaty

19. See Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Slovenia Estonia, of the other part, O.J. L 51/3 (1999); Europe Agreement with Estonia, supra note
18, at O.J. L 68/3 (1998); Europe Agreement establishing an association between the
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Lithuania, of the other part, O.J. L 51/3 (1998); Europe Agreement establishing an
association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one
part, and the Republic of Latvia, of the other part, O.J. L 26/3 (1998); Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part, O.J. L 360/2
(1994); Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Slovak Republic, of the other
part, O.J. L 359/2 (1994); Europe Agreement establishing an association between the
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Bulgaria, of the other part, O.J. L 358/3 (1994); Europe Agreement establishing an
association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one
part, and Romania, of the other part, O.J. L 357/2 (1994); Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the
one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part, O.J. L 348/2 (1993); Europe
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other part, O.J. L
347/2 (1993).
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20

The main question to be addressed when reflecting on the
actual impact of these provisions of the Europe Agreements was
that of direct effect, i.e., whether they were capable of creating
rights and obligations for individuals that had to be respected
and enforced by national and European competition authorities
and courts. The literature on the possible direct effect of provisions contained in the Europe Agreements is plentiful and the
practice is not always coherent. 2 1 In the present context, however, the situation is quite unambiguous. The Europe Agreements themselves provided for the respective Association Councils to adopt, by a given deadline, "the necessary rules" to implement the articles dealing with competition. Thus, the provisions
on competition in the Europe Agreements, in and of themselves,
22
clearly did not have direct effect.
Pursuant to the European Court of Justice's consistent practice, it is equally unambiguous that the decisions of the Association Councils may have direct effect. 23 This occurs whenever
these decisions contain a clear and precise right or obligation,
which is not conditional, in its implementation or effects, upon
the prior adoption of another measure.2 4
With regard to the competition provisions in the Europe
Agreements, the Association Councils have indeed adopted certain decisions regarding implementation. One of the first decisions adopted by most of the Association Councils is aimed at
20. Europe Agreement with Estonia, supra note 18, art. 63, O.J. L 68/3, at 17
(1998).
21. See Frank Emmert & Erelin Kikas, The Implementation of the Principle of Non-Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in the Preparationsfor EU Membership, in ACCESSION
NEGOTIATIONS SELECTED RFSULTS, 237-64 (Janusz Swierkocki ed., 2001) (discussing
the specific problems arising in Estonia, where the Constitution provides for supremacy
of international agreements over parliamentary legislation).
22. See Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwhbisch Gmfind, Case 12/86, [1987] E.C.R.
3719,
14, 17, 20-28; Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A., Case
104/81, [1982) E.C.R. 3641; R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, Case 181/73, [1974]
E.C.R. 449. For further analysis see Ilona Cheyne, Haegeman,Demirel and their Progeny, in
THE GENERAL LAw OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS 20-41 (Alan Dashwood & Christophe
Hillion eds., 2000).

23. See Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van justitie, Case C-192/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3461,

13-26.
24. Id. at
15, citing Demirel, [1987] E.C.R., at
14. See also Selma Kadiman v.
Freistaat Bayern, Case C-351/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2133; Ahmet Bozkurt v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie, Case C-434/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1475.
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"adopting the necessary rules for the implementation" of the respective article in the Europe Agreement itself.2 5 The decisions
are largely uniform. In their annex, they contain articles on
"general principles," cases falling into the "competence of [EU
and national] competition authorities;" cases falling under the
"competence of one competition authority only;" mutual requests for information; secrecy and confidentiality of information; the application of the EU block exemption regulations;
merger control; activities of minor importance; and various procedural rules for the Association Councils. In a nutshell, the decisions provide for the application of EU competition law and
policy to the bilateral trade between the parties of the agreement. For cases falling under the jurisdiction of both the Commission and the competition authority in the associated country,
the rules provide for mutual notification and collaboration. Furthermore, it is stipulated that "without prejudice to any of their
rights or obligations, the competition authorities involved in
consultations under this Article shall endeavor to find a mutually
acceptable solution ....
For activities of minor importance,
the threshold is set at an annual turnover not exceeding 200 million Euro and a market share of less than five percent in both the
EU internal market and the domestic market of the associated
country.2 7
",26

25. For Association Council decisions between the European Communities and
their Member States, and certain Republics adopting the necessary rules regarding the
implantation of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, see Association Council Decision
No. 2001/504/EC, OJ. L 183/28 (2001) [hereinafter AC-Latvia]; Association Council
Decision No. 2001/367/EC, OJ. L 130/35 (2000) [hereinafter AC-Slovenial; Association Council Decision No. 1999/411/EC, O.J. L 156/33 (1999) [hereinafter AC-Lithuania]; Association Council Decision No. 1999/372/EC, OJ. L 144/16 (1999) [hereinafter AC-Estonia]; Association Council Decision No. 1999/249/EC, OJ. L 96/22 (1999)
[hereinafter AC-Romania]; Association Council Decision No. 98/82/EC, OJ. L 15/37
(1997) [hereinafter AC-Bulgaria]; Association Council Decision No. 96/651/EC, O.J. L
295/25 (1996) [hereinafter AC-Slovakia]; Association Council Decision No. 96/494/
EC, OJ. L 208/24 (1996) [hereinafter AC-Poland]; and Association Council Decision
No. 96/133/EC, OJ. L 31/21 (1996) [hereinafter AC-Czech Republic].
26. Annexes of the Association Council Decisions, art. 2.3, 1 2. See AC-Latvia,
supra note 25, O.J. L 183/28, at 30 (2001); AC-Slovenia, supra note 25, O.J. L 130/35, at
38 (2000); AC-Lithuania, supra note 25, OJ. L 156/33, at 35 (1999); AC-Estonia, supra
note 25, OJ. L 144/16, at 19 (1999); AC-Romania, supra note 25, O.J. L 96/22, at 24
(1999); AC-Bulgaria, supra note 25, O.J. L 15/37, at 38 (1997); AC-Slovakia, supra note
25, O.J. L 295/25 (1996); AC-Poland, supra note 25, OJ. L 208/24 (1996); and ACCzech Republic, supra note 25, OJ. L 31/21 (1996).
27. See AC-Latvia, supra note 25, O.J. L 183/28, at 31 (2001); AC-Slovenia, supra
note 25, O.J. L 130/35, at 38 (2000); AC-Lithuania, supra note 25, OJ. L 156/33, at 36
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What this means is that since the entry into force of the respective decisions, i.e., since their publication in the Official
Journal of the EU ("O.J.") and the corresponding national gazette, the rules of EU competition law, in particular Article 81
(including the block-exemption regulations), Article 82, and the
provisions on merger control, are already applicable in the associated countries, as far as trade between the internal market of
the EU and the partner country may be affected. Concretely, an
agreement between undertakings having such an effect may already be void and unenforceable for and against its parties.
Also, competitors of participants to illegal agreements or companies affected by a dominant enterprise's abuse of power can already bring claims for discontinuation of restrictive practices
and even for damages (under tort law) going back to the date of
publication of the respective decision.
From practical experience, I can tell that this fact is still
widely unknown among legal counsel of large enterprises in
CEECs and attorneys in these countries, let alone among the
judges and administrative officers. For the time being, the prevailing - and erroneous - attitude is that EU law is something
to be analyzed after membership has actually been realized.
Thus, we may safely presume that a good number of the interenterprise agreements that have been drafted by attorneys are
being implemented without any regard to Article 81(1) and the
relevant block exemption regulations. In other cases, attorneys
and other legal counsel have endorsed - and will continue to
do so - commercial practices that violate Article 82. As a result,
clients are ill-advised, breaching binding legal standards, over- or
under-utilizing commercial opportunities, and/or risking embarrassing litigation and damage claims from suppliers, clients,
or competitors. As long as there is a kind of cartel, or at least
concerted practice, on behalf of the attorneys in CEECs to bury
their heads in the sand, the risk may seem small. But relying on
similar willful ignorance on the other side is not a sound strategy
when large commercial deals are at stake. Nevertheless, it will
probably take a spectacular professional liability case to be
brought against well-known attorneys or law firms in Central and
(1999); AC-Estonia, supra note 25, O.J. L 144/16, at 19 (1999); AC-Romania, supra note
25, O.J. L 96/22, at 24-25 (1999); AC-Bulgaria, supra note 25, O.J. L 15/37, at 39
(1997); AC-Slovakia, supra note 25, O.J. L 295/25 (1996); AC-Poland, supra note 25,
O.J. L 208/24 (1996); and AC-Czech Republic, supra note 25, O.J. L 31/21 (1996).
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Eastern Europe before the new realities are widely acknowledged and taken seriously by the legal communities in these
countries.
II. OBLIGATIONS UPON NEW MEMBER STATES
As of day one of full membership, the CEECs will have to
implement and apply the entire acquis communautaire, with the
sole exception of those rules and provisions that have been specifically subjected to transitional periods by way of the accession
treaties. The Commission has outlined all transitional periods
agreed upon in the accession negotiations in a Spring 2003 report to the European Parliament.2 8 According to this report, Estonia, 29 Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia did not ask for any transitional periods with respect to competition law. The other candidates asked for and obtained a few exceptions that are rather
limited both in time and scope. The vast majority concern certain existing State aid schemes for certain sectors of the economy that have to be phased out. No candidate country has asked
for and received any exceptions with regard to the application of
Articles 81 and 82 or the merger control regulations.3 0 Thus, all
relevant articles of the treaties, almost all regulations, and almost
all other legal instruments of EU competition law and policy will
be fully applicable in and for the new Member States from the
first day of membership onwards. It is useful, therefore, to examine in some detail what this means. What are the expectations to be met by CEECs as far as institutional preparations and
substantive rules are concerned?
A. InstitutionalRequirements to Be Met Upon Accession
On the one hand, the EU has not spelled out to the candidate countries the respective institutional and substantive expectations which should be met before the doors to membership
28. See Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Results of the Negotiations on the Accession of Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to the European Union, available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/pdf/negotiations-report-to-ep.pdf
(2003).
29. On Estonia, see also Emmert, supra note 21.
30. See European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement, Enlargementof the
European Union - Guide to the Negotiations Chapterby Chapter, available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/negotiationsguide.pdf (2003).
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will open. It is a good European tradition to respect national
sovereignty and differences, and to require harmonization only
as far as it is indispensable. 1 Consequently, comparative analysis
of the institutional and substantive regimes in the "old" Member
States will show many significant differences and it may safely be
presumed that the "new" Member States would have to be
granted similar leg room.
On the other hand, there is also the general principle that
EU law has to be effectively implemented by the Member
States. 2 Hence, the Member States are under the obligation to
create the necessary legal and institutional infrastructure to ensure that Community law will be applied and respected.3 3 To a
large extent, therefore, the expectations to be met by acceding
countries can be gleaned from the existing legal rules and documents. Obviously, it makes a difference in this context whether
the EU has resorted mainly to directly applicable regulations in a
given area of law, for example in competition law, or whether it
has relied on directives which need to be implemented by national legislation, as it is for the common rules applicable to
trade in the internal market.
Furthermore, it makes a difference whether the EU institutions are provided with direct administrative powers, such as in
31. This tradition is reflected in but goes beyond the principle of subsidiarity. See
Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, OJ. C 325/33, at 42 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at
80-81 (ex Article 3b). Article 5 states:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of

the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Id.
32. This follows from Article 10 of the EC treaty and its expansive interpretation by
the European Court ofJustice. See id. art. 10, OJ. 325/33, at 42 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 81
(ex Article 5) (stating in part that "Member States shall take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the Institutions of the Community").

33. See, e.g., Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Joined Cases
C-46 & C-48/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1029,
67-74; Comet BV v. Produktschap voor
Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043,
13-16; Rewe-Zentrallinanz eG and
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer ffir das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976]
E.C.R. 1989,
5; International Fruit Company NV and Others v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, Joined Cases 51-54/71, [1971] E.C.R. 1107,
3-4; Otto Scheer v.
Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle ffirGetreide und Futtermittel, Case 30/70, [1970] E.C.R.
1197,
8. See also KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 419-26 (1999).
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the area of competition law, or whether they largely depend on
the administrative capacity of the national authorities, as it is the
case for the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy
("CAP"). Institutional expectations upon the Member States will
thus be lower in the area of competition law and policy when
compared to most other areas of EU law. Nevertheless, a number of specific obligations imposed on the national competition
authorities and upon the national courts can be identified.
With regard to the application of EU competition law and
policy, institutional requirements upon the Member States were
traditionally found in: (a) Articles 84 and 85 of the EC Treaty;
(b) Regulation 17"4 and its interpretation by the European
Court; (c) the 1993 Commission Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty; 35 and (d) the 1997 Commission
Notice on Cooperation Between National Competition Authorities and the Commission in Handling Cases Falling Within the
Scope of Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty. 6 For the future, the
dominant role will be played by Council Regulation No. 1/2003
of December 16, 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on
37
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,
which is replacing Regulation 17 and its implementing legislation.
The first conclusion to be drawn from these sources is the
fact that each Member State should have a national competition
authority.3 " However, there are no rules as to the institutional
34. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 19591962, at 87, amended by Council Regulation No. 59/62, 58J.O. 1655 (1962), amended by
Council Regulation No. 118/63, 162 J.O. 2696 (1963), amended by Council Regulation
No. 2822/71, 285J.O. 49 (1971) [hereinafter Reg. 17].
35. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 39/6 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission].
36. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 313/3 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Notice on Cooperation Between National Authorities and the Commission]. For analysis see J.H.
Maitland-Walker, Commission Notice on Co-operationBetween National Competition Authorities
and the Commission in HandlingCases FallingWithin the Scope of Articles 85 and 86 of the E.C.
Treaty, 2 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 124, 124-26 (1998).
37. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 (2002). This regulation will replace the old regime established by Regulation 17 as of May 1, 2004. For more detailed
analysis see below.
38. This follows from many provisions of EU law that refer to "the authorities of
the Member States." See, e.g. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 84, 85, O.J. C
325/33, at 66 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 94 (ex Articles 88, 89). See also Reg. 17, art. 9 et seq.,
13 J.O. 204 (1962), Reg. 1/2003, art. 3 et seq. O.J. L 1 (2003).
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structure of such an authority; hence it could be an independent
agency or a sub-unit of a ministry. Furthermore, it is not immediately evident what kind of powers an authority should have in
order to be considered the appropriate national competition authority. On the one hand, the Commission strongly desires that
the competition authorities of the Member States should have
the power to apply Articles 81 and 82"9 - besides applying their
national law - since these provisions have long been held to be
directly effective and, therefore, capable of creating enforceable
rights and obligations directly for and against individuals in the
Member States that have to be respected by the national courts.
On the other hand, the competition authorities of a number of
Member States did not have the power to apply Articles 81 and
82 in the past4" and the European Court has held that such differences between the application of EU competition law in the
Member States do not violate the principle of equal treatment
under Article 12.41 It seems that this is changing with the entry
into force of Regulation 1/2003.42
In this respect, the candidate countries have all done their
homework. Every CEEC has adopted some kind of national
competition law and all of them have created or designated competition authorities.4" The second conclusion to be drawn from
39. See 1997 Notice on Cooperation Between National Authorities and the Commission,
5 et seq., in particular 1 15, O.J. C 313 (1997).
40. Only the authorities of Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain have had this power. The authorities of Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom did not have the
power to apply Community competition law. See AugustJ. Braakman, European Commission, The Application of Articles 85-86 of the EC Treaty by National Courts in the
Member States, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/
art8586_en.pdf (July 1997); see also European Commission, Surveys of the Member States'
Powers to Investigate and Sanction Violations of National Competition Laws (1995) [hereinafter Competition Surveys]; Ute Zinsmeister et al., The Application of Articles 85 and 86 of
the E. C. Treaty by National Competition Authorities, EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 275, 275-79
(1999).
41. SeeWilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, [1969] C.M.L.R.
100.
42. Art. 35(1) of the new regulation stipulates: the "Member States shall designate
the competition authorities or authorities responsible for the application of Articles 81
and 82 of the Treaty in such a way that the provisions of this regulation are effectively
complied with." Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 35(1), O.J. L 1/1, at 21 (2003).
43. For information on the respective authorities and laws, see Anti-trust and State
Aid Authorities and Legislation in the Candidate Countries, available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/competition/enlargement/candidatecountries.
For more specific information on the timing of competition law adoption, with Hungary and Poland taking
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the aforementioned sources is the fact that each Member State
must provide for courts that are competent to handle cases of
infringement of EU competition law. 44 Again, there are no specific criteria as to how these courts should be organized. Therefore, it is possible to designate specific courts or to entrust the
task to general administrative or commercial courts. However,
the expectation would be that the application be effective.45 At a
minimum, this seems to require that the competent courts are
aware of their power, which must be exercised ex officio and not
only upon application," and that the jurisdiction of the designated courts is stipulated by law and thus "that individuals are in
a position to know with certainty the full extent of their rights in
order to rely on them, where appropriate, before the national
courts. ""4
B. Substantive Requirements with Regard to the Application of
EU Competition Law
As mentioned above, there are no formal rules as to the
powers and procedures of national competition authorities
when acting in an area (also) covered by EU competition law.
the lead in 1990, see Dutz, supra note 14. The most comprehensive source for information on current and future administrative capacity in the CEECs and on those legislative
changes which still have to be made, can be found in the National Programmes for
Adoption of the Acquis 2002-2003, which were adopted by each candidate country. See,
e.g., Office of Europe Integration, National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
2002-2003, available at http://www.eib.ee/pages.php/02030103 (Estonia) (2002-2003).
However, the information in the respective NPAAs is certainly not the most self-critical.
Interestingly, a similar program has also been drawn up by Croatia already at a time
when that country was not formally even a candidate country. See THE REPUBLIC OF
CROATIA,

ACTION

PLAN FOR EUROPEAN

INTEGRATION

OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

(1999). Finally, comparative analysis of national competition laws of the "old" Member
States can be found in IMMENGA & MESTMACKER, supra note 5, at 41-52.
44. This follows from the direct effect, which has been attributed to Articles 81 and
82. See Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51;
Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Brftu AG, Case C-234/89 [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 45. As
of May 1, 2004 it will follow directly from Article 6 and other provisions of Reg. 1/2003.
45. For a comprehensive analysis of the principle of effective remedies in national
courts, see TAris TRnmMAs, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAw, 276-312 (1999).
46. This was clearly spelled out by the European Court of Justice in van Schijndel
& van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, Joined Cases C-430 & C431/93 [1995] E.C.R. 1-4705,
14-15.
47. The requirement of implementation of Community rights by national law and not only by administrative order or practical application - has been affirmed
many times. The quoted passage is taken from the judgment of the E.C.J. of May 30,
1991 in Commission v. Germany, Case C-361/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2567,
20.
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However, analysis of the relevant passages of EU law and the Notices published by the Commission can provide some insights
about the expectations placed upon new Member States.
The distribution of powers and responsibilities between the
Commission and the national authorities will change dramatically as of May 1, 2004 under Regulation 1/2003. It is no coincidence that this is also the day when the EU will grow from fifteen
to twenty-five Member States. The Commission has had
problems keeping up with its workload and did not see itself in a
position to handle ten additional countries, particularly since
the majority of those emerged only relatively recently from Communist planned economies and will have their share of difficulties with the implementation of EU law. Therefore, the Commission pressed for a radical re-distribution of responsibilities, and
the national authorities will have many new responsibilities as of
next May. This will be analyzed in more detail below. For now,
it is also worthwhile to look at the old rules because their implementation record by the candidate countries can provide insights into specific problems that may impact the implementation of the future rules.
1. Substantive Requirements Imposed on National Authorities
by the Law in Force
Again, we shall first look at the competition authorities, i.e.,
the administration. Article 84 places an obligation on "the authorities in Member States [to] rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant position in the common market in accordance with the law
of their country and . . . Article 81 . . . and 82" until the entry
into force of the necessary powers for the European Commission. This provision largely lost its importance with the entry
into force of Regulation 17. However, it is still applicable to
commercial sectors which are exempt from the application of
EU competition powers, such as air and sea transport between
the EU and third States. More substantial powers were given to
national authorities by Article 9(2) of Regulation 17. According
to this provision, the authorities of the Member States were
called upon to apply Articles 81(1) and 82 "as long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure."
The incentive for national authorities to apply EU competi-
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tion law on their own was nevertheless limited. First, they might
open proceedings concerning Articles 81 or 82 only to lose their
competence if and when the Commission also opened proceedings.48 In case they terminated their proceedings and decided
the case, the Commission might still open proceedings and decide the case differently. The principle of supremacy of EU law
would in such a case render the national decision inapplicable.
Finally, the national authorities could only enforce Articles
81(1) and 82. Until May 1, 2004, when Regulation 1/2003 becomes applicable, they will not have the authority to grant individual exemptions under Article 81(3). They were thus more
likely to apply nationalcompetition law,49 which can generally be
applied alongside EU competition law. Yet, even when applying
national rules, the national authorities have had to keep an eye
on EU competition law since they must not bring about conflict-

ing results. Thus, they cannot exempt a certain conduct on the
basis of national law if the Commission wants to prohibit it and
they cannot prohibit a conduct on the basis of stricter national
law if the Commission has already exempted it or has at least
received a notification from the enterprise (s) involved and there
is a good chance that an exemption will be granted. In the interest of procedural economy therefore, it has been advisable for
national authorities to suspend their procedures as soon as the
Commission opened a formal investigation.
Regulation 17 contained a number of provisions on collaboration between the EU Commission and national competition
authorities. Article 10 of Regulation 17 provided for mutual information or liaison between the Commission and the national
authorities. Under Article 11, the Commission could request information from the national authorities and had to inform them
about any requests for information sent directly to undertakings
and associations in their territory. If the Commission wanted to
conduct a general inquiry into a sector of the economy, it had to
inform the respective national authorities according to Article
48. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(3), 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec.
ed. 1959-1962 (stating "[a]s long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure
under Articles 2, 3 or 6, the authorities of the Member States shall remain competent to
apply Article 85(1) or Article 86"). It should also be noted, however, that the national
competence can be restored if the Commission decides to terminate an investigation
without adopting a final decision on the matter.
49. See KORAH, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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12 and then could request information from them. The corresponding duty not to disclose business secrets and other confidential information could be found in Article 20(2) of the Regulation. Article 13 of Regulation 17 placed an obligation upon
"the competent authorities of the Member States"5 ° to undertake investigations at the request of the Commission and to issue
the necessary authorizations to their officials. More importantly
in practice, Article 14 required the national authorities to assist
the Commission's own officials when making investigations in
the territory of the Member States. These investigations became
famous as "dawn raids" and played an important role in the enforcement of EU competition law.5 1
In the field of merger control, Article 9 of Regulation 4064/
8952 provides detailed criteria for cases in which a planned concentration that has been notified to the Commission can be referred to the national authorities. Many more useful hints on
the expectations upon national competition authorities could be
found in the Commission Notice of 1997, including elaborate
guidelines on the allocation of cases which (potentially) fell into
both the competence of the Commission and of the national authorities.
As far as national courts were concerned, the obligations
placed upon them by EU competition law were even more
straightforward. On the basis of the direct effect of Articles
81(1) and 82, the national courts not only had the power, but
also the obligation of applying these provisions in cases that
came before them.5" This meant that individuals and companies
who complained about other individuals or companies potentially violating EU competition law had to "have access to all procedural remedies provided for by national law on the same con50. See supra note 48.
51. An illustrative example for the problems that may arise in practice when an
enterprise does not cooperate in an investigation and the national authorities are requested to provide police powers can be found in Hoechst AG v. Commission of the
European Communities, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2859.
52. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, Oj. L 257, at 13 (1990), amended by Council
Regulation No. 1310/97, O.J. L 180 (1987) [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
53. See Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51,
16 (holding that "as the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) and 86 tend by their very nature to produce direct effects in relations between individuals, these Articles create direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard").
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ditions as would apply if a comparable breach of national law
were involved." 4
Articles 81 and 82 may come before national courts in particular in the following scenarios: a) in contract law, a party to
an agreement may claim that this agreement is anti-competitive
and thus unenforceable under Article 81(2); b) a victim of abusive behavior by a dominant firm may seek an injunction to end
the infringement; and c) individuals or undertakings who have
suffered damages due to the application of anti-competitive
agreements or abusive behavior may seek compensation under
tort law. As noted above, in such cases the national courts were
under an obligation to ensure the effective application of EU
competition law. This could require careful analysis of secondary EU law in force, the case law of the ECJ and the CFI, as well
as decisions by the Commission in similar cases. Whenever such
analysis might have left important questions unanswered, which
had to be resolved in order to allow the national court to render
judgment, the latter had to consider the preliminary reference
procedure under Article 234 of the Treaty. In light of the average twenty-four month duration of a 234-procedure in Luxembourg, provisional measures might have been necessary in the
interim, to prevent irreparable damage to the parties. Again,
the respective Commission Notice provided additional practical
guidance.
2. Substantive Requirements Imposed on the National
Authorities as of May 1, 2004
The Commission has long been overburdened with
thousands of notifications and requests for individual exemptions. To cope with the caseload, the Commission has adopted a
number of block-exemption regulations and has resorted to the
practice of responding with mere "comfort-letters," rather than
binding decisions (negative clearance or exemption), to the
bulk of the inquiries and applications. Nevertheless, the caseload cannot be handled any more in a proper manner and the
Member State representatives, in the context of the budgetary
negotiations, have refused to allocate significantly larger re54. See 1993 Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commis-

sion, O.J. C 39, at 6,

11 (1993).
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sources for additional staff.5 5 Therefore, the Commission proposed in 1999 to delegate more powers to the authorities of the
Member States. The concrete proposals were outlined in the
White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Art.
85 and 86 of April 28, 199956 and can be summarized as follows.
First of all, the need for prior notification of an agreement
which might infringe Article 81 (1) - and thus the possibility to
get a comfort letter, a negative clearance, or an exemption from
the Commission and be protected from possible sanctions - will
be abolished. This will place the responsibility for lawful conduct on the undertakings without offering the previous help so
frequently asked for from the Commission. Secondly, the national competition authorities will be enabled to grant individual
exemptions under Article 81(3). This will give them important
responsibilities that may often be difficult to exercise, considering the need to avoid contradicting decisions in different Member States and discriminatory treatment of internationally operating enterprises.
Finally, the responsibility for the effective enforcement of
EU competition law will be placed primarily upon the national
competition authorities and the national courts. This will not
only substantially increase the work load of the national authorities; it will also, for better or worse, put the protection of the
European competition system, as a whole, largely into the hands
of the Member State competition boards and their courts. Even
though the European Commission will obviously retain important supervisory powers and decide those cases which are of panEuropean interest or raise entirely new legal issues,57 and even if
the national courts can avail themselves of the procedure under
Article 234 to get help from the European Court of Justice, it is
clear that this "modernization" will have far-reaching consequences, not only for the expectations upon the old and new
Member States, but also for the very project of the internal market and workable competition in it.
55. The problems are explained in greater detail in JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 5,
at 1015-37.
56. Commission White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Art. 85
and 86 of the EC Treaty, O.J. C 132/1 (1999).
57. For a critical analysis of the discretionary power foreseen for the Commission
to take up cases it considers important, see Fritz Rittner, Kartellpolitik und Gewaltenteilung
in der EG, 2 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRiF-r FOR WATIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 129 (2000).
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After a broad and sometimes controversial international debate amongst practitioners, academics, and Member State representatives, the reforms were finally adopted by the European
Council as Regulation 1/2003 on December 16, 2002. This Regulation replaces Regulation 17 and amends a range of other regulations that used to refer to Regulation 17. It effectively implements the proposed re-nationalization of the supervisory powers
in competition law but also retains broad powers for the Commission to intervene in procedures before the national authorities. In a nutshell, the new system, which will become applicable
as of May 1, 2004, places many more responsibilities on the national authorities, not only by making them the primary enforcers of EU competition law, but also by requiring them to collaborate both horizontally with the competition authorities of the
other Member States, as well as vertically with the Commission
itself. If anything, the requirements to be met by the national
authorities have become more serious and more complicated.
Concretely, the system retains the principle that anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices are prohibited if
they do not satisfy the requirements of Article 81(3).5 What is
new is the stipulation that anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices that do fulfill the requirements of Article 81(3)
are lawful without a need to obtain an individual exemption or
to conform to a block exemption. As mentioned earlier, it will
now be left to the undertakings to assess their current or intended future conduct in light of existing rules and case-law.
The notification procedure will be eliminated.
Article 3 of the new Regulation specifically deals with cases
where the national authorities apply national competition law,
even though the case may affect trade between Member States.
It spells out the obligation of the national authorities in these
cases to also apply Articles 81 and/or 82 of the Treaty. For
agreements and concerted practices, the second paragraph of
Article 3 makes it clear that national authorities must not prohibit something that either does not restrict competition in the
sense of Article 81(1) or qualifies for exemption under Article
81(3). Stricter national rules are allowed only for the treatment
of unilateral conduct that is primarily in the context of Article
82.
58. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 1(1), O.J. L 1/1 (2002).
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Article 5 of the new Regulation spells out the powers of the
national authorities in the application of EU competition law,
that is for cases that may affect trade between Member States.
The authorities are specifically given the power to require "that
an infringement [of EU competition law] be brought to an end,"
the power of "ordering interim measures," the power of "accepting commitments," and the power of "imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in their
national law." Since Regulation 1/2003 "shall have general application" and "be binding in its entirety and directly applicable
in all Member States,"59 these powers of the national authorities
come into being as of May 1, 2004 for cases that may affect trade
between Member States even if national law does not provide for
them. The same is true for the national courts, which are given
"the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty."60
Naturally, the new powers do not come without responsibilities. Since anti-competitive behavior that may affect trade between Member States is illegal per se, contracts to this end must
not be enforced, distortions of competition must be terminated
and proven damage must be compensated. If the authorities administrative and or judicial - of a Member State fail to fulfill
these obligations, the Member State is in breach of its obligations and may become subject to proceedings under Article 226
of the Treaty, and claims for State liability under the Francovich
doctrine. 6 '
Under the new Regulation, the Commission retains important supervisory powers. It can establish whether an infringement of EU competition law has occurred and order its termination.6 2 The Commission has this power after receiving a complaint or on its own initiative and regardless of whether or not
the case has already been taken up or even decided by the national authorities. Article 7(2) specifically stipulates that the
Commission can receive complaints from Member States and
also from "natural or legal persons who can show a legitimate
59. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 249,
2, O.J. C 325/33, at 132
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 128 (ex Article 189).
60. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 6, O.J. L 1/1 (2002).
61. Francovich and Bonifaci v. Republic of Italy, Joined Cases 6 & 9/90, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-5357, 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993).
62. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 7, O.J. L 1/1, at 9 (2002).
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interest. '63 This opens a direct avenue for review of national authorities' action or inaction.
In light of the fact that anti-competitive behavior that may
affect trade between Member States by necessity concerns at
least two Member States, potential conflicts between the authorities of different Member States are built into the system. This
could become a source of many problems, including procedural
overlap, contradictory decisions with regard to one and the same
case, different standards for similar types of cases, and other
forms of discriminatory treatment of enterprises in the internal
market. To reduce the probability and scope of these kind of
problems, Chapter IV of Regulation 1/2003 imposes a range of
cooperation procedures and obligations on the various national
authorities. The application of EU competition law shall be
done "inclose cooperation" of all competition authorities of the

Member States and the Commission. 64 The Member State authorities must always inform the Commission "before or without
delay after commencing the first formal investigative measures"
when acting under Article 81 or 82.65 The Member State authorities are also given the power to exchange information horizontally with their counterparts in the other Member States.6 6 Arti-

cle 13 specifically addresses the cases where the authorities of
two or more Member States are contemplating to act, are in the
process of acting, or have dealt with a case. The Regulation envisages "a network of public authorities applying the Community
competition rules in close cooperation."67 The national courts
are also receiving specific powers to request information from
the Commission and/or their national competition authorities,
and the national competition authorities not only receive the
corresponding powers to provide such information upon request but even of their own motion. 68 Last but not least, any

national court judgment deciding "on the application of Article
81 or 82" has to be forwarded "without delay" to the Commission. 69
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 7(2), O.J. L 1/1, at 9 (2002).
art. 11(1), O.J. L 1/1, at 10 (2002).
art. 11(3), O.J. L 1/1, at 10 (2002).
art. 12, O.J. L 1/1, at 10 (2002).
pmbl.,
15-18, O.J. L 1/1, at 4 (2002).
art. 15, O.J. L 1/1, at 12 (2002).
art. 15(2), O.J. L 1/1, at 12 (2002).

2004]

INTRODUCING EU COMPETITION LAW

Without going into further detail, it is clear that the new
supervisory system will only succeed if two central requirements
are fulfilled: 1) the competition authorities and the competent
courts of all Member States have to be able to exercise the powers bestowed upon them by Regulation 1/2003 when they are
applying or have to apply EU competition law; and 2) the competition authorities of all Member States and the competent
courts have to be willing to cooperate fully with their counterparts in the other Member States and with the Commission.
With regard to the ability to fulfill these requirements,
problems may arise in particular for those national authorities
that have not traditionally exercised these kinds of powers and
are insufficiently prepared for it. This is not only the case in
CEECs but also in several of the old Member States.
With regard to the willingness to fulfill the requirements,
problems may arise in particular for those national authorities
that are not fully independent from political processes and may
come under pressure to treat national undertakings differently
from foreign undertakings. Again, this is potentially the case
both in CEECs and in several of the old Member States.
The remaining parts of this Article will look closer at ways
and means to reduce these risks and to create a network of national authorities of all twenty-five Member States that truly fulfills its mission.
III. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF NATIONAL
COMPETITION LAW
On the one hand, EU law does not provide any detailed obligations for the content and administration of national competition law. Again, the candidate countries can rely on differences
which continue to exist among the "old" Member States.7 ° Thus,
for example, some Member States have the same principles as
provided for in Article 81 (1) and (3) in their national laws, i.e., a
per se prohibition of anti-competitive agreements with a possibility of exemption. In other Member States, such agreements are
not illegal as such and can only be prohibited on a case-by-case
basis. Some Member States provide different rules for horizon70. The following information is based on IMMENGA & MESTIMACKER, supra note 5,
at 46-52. See also Competition Surveys, supa note 40.
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tal and vertical agreements, others do not. In some Member
States, decisions regarding the prohibition of certain types of
agreements or behavior must be taken strictly on the basis of
legal and economic criteria, in other Member States considerations of economic or even social policy are explicitly permitted
or even required. Furthermore, there are many differences as
far as the institutional architecture of the national competition
authorities is concerned.
On the other hand, it is nevertheless possible to identify
some mistakes which should be avoided and some principles
which should be followed by CEECs who want to create effective
national competition rules and procedures.
In several CEECs, the competition authorities are weak institutions by design. Either the supervisory functions are spread
out between several different units with unclear delimitation of
competencies and powers or competition supervision is entrusted to departments under the authority of a ministry and
thus subject to political directives.
Virtually all over Central and Eastern Europe, the public
service, and hence administrative units such as competition
boards, has been suffering from a shortage of qualified lawyers
and economists. Relatively low salaries, insufficiently attractive
working environments, and traditionally low prestige of "State
jobs" did not help in attracting the best graduates from national
universities, let alone experts with practical experience or Western training. Furthermore, as shall be developed below, in-house
training programs have often not been very effective.
Structural weaknesses of the institutions and their staff are
frequently exacerbated by poorly drafted laws which are either
home-made and reflect the drafter's lack of experience, or they
are imported and basically just translate EU or Western statutes.
To give but one example: those who have worked with Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty in practice will appreciate the indispensable guidance on the interpretation of these provisions which
has to be drawn from the case law of the European Court of
Justice, including the more recent decisions of the Court of First
Instance, and to some extent the decisions of the European
Commission. Only the most basic and straightforward cases can
be dealt with by looking at the Articles themselves, as written
into the Treaty. All "interesting" questions, such as whether or
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not a national pension fund can be considered to be an "undertaking" for the purposes of Articles 81 or 82, or whether instructions from the mother company to a fifty percent owned subsidiary must be seen as an "agreement" under Article 81, will require
extensive knowledge of the practice of the EU institutions. Nevertheless, several CEECs have pretty much translated only these
Treaty articles and are using this as the core of their national
competition laws.
The practice of merely translating EU laws or the laws of a
Member State such as Germany is also inadequate in light of the
fact that these Western competition rules have not been designed for and are ill-suited to deal with certain problems that
are distinct and typical for transition economies.7 1 Such distinct
problems may seem short-lived, such as privatization and the dissolution of State monopolies, but even where privatization was
successful,7 2 lack of broadly distributed national wealth has already led to concentration of economic power in the hands of a
few national or foreign investors. In other areas, privatization
was less successful or has not happened yet 3 and State aids to
ailing monopolists may still be rampant. For these areas, the
CEECs will have no choice but to develop their own solutions
and legal rules.
Other problems which are not fully taken into account by
Western rules include the widespread lack of transparency in the
Central and Eastern European markets, lack of reliable statistics,
and the absence of a culture of cooperation and communication. At least some of these issues will only be solved via genera71. See Nicolaides & Mathis, supra note 7, at 487.
72. For an early analysis, see PETAR SARPtEVI, PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (1992). See also Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov, Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic (Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 227, 1999); EVZEN KOCENDA &JAN SVEjNAR, THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP FORMS AND CONCENTRATION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AFTER LARGE-SCALE PRIVATIZA-

(Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 471, 2002) (presenting a more specific analysis); Rainhart Lang & Sven Mfiller, Privatisation,Perception of Success and Attitudes of Managers in the East German Transformation Process, in 3 TEN YEARS OF ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION 391-407 (Kari Liuhto
ed., 2001); Nandini Gupta et al., Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and
Evidence from the Czech Republic (Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 323a,
2001).
73. See, e.g. Vijai Maheshwari, Derailed: Estonia'sPioneeringRailway PrivatizationEnds
in Turmoil, Bus. CENT. EUR., Feb. 2001, at 27.
TION
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7'
A. Other Problems in Practice

As the present Article has shown, the requirements placed
upon the competition authorities and courts in the Member
States are manifold and often complex. On May 1, 2004, the
system will take another quantum leap in that same direction.
The effective application of EU competition law, therefore, requires that administrative authorities, prosecutors, attorneys,
and judges collaborate in a sensible manner domestically and
with their counterparts in other Member States and with the
Commission. If there is a cartel of silence among national lawyers, where legal counsel of both sides is either oblivious to the
fact that EU competition law should be applied to the case at
hand or where counsel feels it might be relevant but hopes for lack of any specific knowledge - that the other side in the
same position will not raise the issue either, we cannot expect
effective application of the law. This, sadly, is still happening
every now and then even in the "old" Member States, where lawyers should have had enough time to inform themselves and
gain practical experience in the application of EU law. Clearly,
the problem will be much more challenging in the "new" Member States as CEECs join the Union.
Legal education in CEECs has been slow to reform. In contrast to East Germany, where not a single law professor was retained after re-unification, it was neither considered necessary
nor possible in the other countries of the region to replace Soviet-era professors with Western-trained lawyers and academics.7 6
74. See Frank Emmert & Jorma Heinonen, Challenges to Estonian Economic Develop-

ment Provided by the ForthcomingEU Membership, in I
MATION -

SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS

TEN YEARS OF ECONOMIC TRANSFOR-

IN TRANSITION

342, 354-71 (Kar Liuhto ed.,

2001).
75. See Frank Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and EasternEurope,

9 EUR. L.J. 288 (2003) (presenting a more detailed analysis);

NETHERLANDS SCIENTIFIC

TowARDs A PAN-EUROPEAN UNION: REPORTS TO THE
GOVERNMENT (2001); Saule Voluckyte, Why is Lithuania Lagging Behind in Terms of
Economic Development? A Legal Analysis from the FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)
Point of View (2002) (unpublished thesis, Concordia International University, Estonia)
(on file with author).
76. As a consequence, I have come across many "colleagues" in CEECs who spent
most of their lives teaching subjects such as scientific communism and have now shifted
into more timely fields, such as constitutional law, without, however, having necessarily
acquired real in-depth knowledge.
COUNCIL FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY,

2004]

INTRODUCING EU COMPETITION LAW

669

To this day, remuneration in the public sector and, consequently, in almost all universities in CEECs is not only lower than
in the private sector but also low in absolute terms. This has
made it difficult for the law schools to attract highly qualified
younger teachers, in particular those who had the chance of
spending a year in Western Europe or the United States for a
Master's program. Most of those who did come back to teach
are simultaneously pursuing a career at the bar or in business.
This is not bad as such but limits the amount of time available
for research, publications, supervision of students, and preparation of lectures.
Academic research is consequently a low priority all over
Central and Eastern Europe. Those who would be qualified are
often too busy, receiving lucrative offers from many sides; and
those who are not qualified often produce results that are not up
to international standards. Many of the younger professors do
not have doctorates and have never produced substantial publications that would satisfy international standards of quality.
Teaching is another problem. Probably more than half of
the professors I have met across Central and Eastern Europe are
teaching by sitting in front of the class, reading and explaining
the respective codes and statutes to their students. Textbooks
are often not available since few who would be qualified to write
them actually find the time and since the laws are being
amended so often that many books would be outdated before
they were printed. In exams, the students are expected to recite
the codes and statutes by heart and repeat the explanations provided by the professor in class. Those who repeat best get the
highest grade, the others get a passing grade. And when seminar papers and final theses are due, it is not only common but
even commonly accepted that the bulk of the papers are either
completely descriptive or straightforward plagiarized.7 7 Real
77. At Concordia, we had very strict rules about plagiarism and academic honesty.
'Ae taught international standards of academic research and publishing in a separate
course and still had to fail a certain percentage of our students on their final papers. I
often heard comments from the students that our standards were far beyond what was
commonly expected or tolerated in other Estonian universities, where their friends
were studying. To give but one concrete example: a well known professor of business
at the State university in Tartu instructed the students in a seminar to translate various
chapters of an American textbook by an American author into Estonian as their seminar papers and to hand in the results on diskette. Subsequently he published an Estonian textbook with these translated chapters under his own name as the author. Ironi-
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analysis and critical thinking are seldom taught and hardly ever
encouraged.
As a result, many lawyers in CEECs lack skills that we would
consider essential in the West. The law is frequently applied in a
very positivist manner, just looking at the law in the books.
Where there are lacunae in the statutes, justice may be denied.7 8
General principles of law and justice, as well as constitutional
and international standards of human rights and due process and the way they can enter into a "normal" case - are little
known and in practice largely irrelevant. 79 Furthermore, there is
no tradition of administrative law as in the West. The concept of
individual rights against State measures did not exist in Soviet
times." Even today, administrative procedure codes are underdeveloped in most CEECs and substantive law is often patchwork. The lack of textbooks, or even just student collections of
the most important statutes, is worse in administrative law than
in any other area of law.
In addition, there is a strange custom in certain CEECs that
precedent is not only not binding but completely ignored.
cally, the scandal which followed was only about the question whether he should have
shared the royalties with his students. Nobody even mentioned the problem of plagiarism and the man certainly did not lose his job. From all my travels and teaching in
other CEECs, I think that I can conclude that the situation there is not fundamentally
different.
78. A well known case in Estonia concerned the legal counsel of a large bank that
was taken over by an even larger bank. In the course of the take-over, the lawyer managed certain securities transactions after which bank assets in excess of I million USD
found themselves in one of his personal bank accounts. After the take-over, the new
owners took the man to court on criminal charges and for repayment of the money.
The case went all the way to the Estonian Supreme Court but ended with a complete
defeat of the bank. The judges had not found any legal rules breached by the lawyer
and thus no legal basis for ordering a repayment of the money. Notions such as unjust
enrichment were either not argued or not accepted. For more detailed analysis, see
Emmert, supra note 75, at 295.
79. In another case from Estonia, ajournalist had publicly criticized a female politician, calling her a bad mother because she left small children at home to pursue her
career. He was taken to court on charges of libel. All the way up to the Supreme Court
his conviction was upheld without anybody ever thinking of the freedom of opinion and
the press. Unfortunately, the journalist was poorly advised and lost his case even before
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. For a more detailed analysis, see
Emmert, supra note 75, at 291-92.
80. When a student of mine doing an internship with a large Swedish law firm in
Lithuania recently represented a client in an administrative court, she was asked
whether she realized that the State measure at issue had been taken in the public, or
rather "State" interest. This alone seemed to settle the case for the judge who probably
blamed "the oversight" on the youth and lack of experience of the intern.
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Judges seem to consider it part of their independence not being
bound or even influenced by precedent. They may actually be
upset when precedents are cited in a legal brief, seeing this as an
attack on their independence. They certainly do not consider it
necessary to explain when and why they deviate from precedent.
As a consequence, judgments are often not systematically published since only students would be interested in them. Furthermore, the outcome of a case is often completely unpredictable
and a court may deviate from another - or even from its own
earlier practice - without a single word of explanation."'
When it comes to EU law, the weaknesses of the education
systems are even more evident. While EU law is nowadays taught
at most - if not all - law schools in CEECs, the courses are
often limited to a descriptive introduction of the institutions and
a historic overview of the integration process. Good textbooks in
domestic languages are often lacking; the situation is even worse
for collections of judgments of the ECJ that go beyond one or
two dozen leading cases. Consequently, EU competition law and
policy, if it is taught at all, focus on superficial analyses of the
Treaty articles, Regulation 17, and the Merger Regulation.
We must not be surprised, therefore, to find relatively few
people who have received a Western-style education and broad
training in EU law during their student years in the national administrations and in the competition authorities. This shortcoming has been realized by the CEECs themselves and has repeatedly been criticized by the Commission. 2 The standard re81. When questioned whether or not they thought that Estonian judges were sufficiently independent, a majority of the respondents actually stated that in their opinion
the judges were too independent. The only logical explanation for such an opinion would
seem to be the fact that the general public does not understand why many cases are
decided the way they are and does not see continuity or coherence in the practice of
the courts. Quite to the contrary, manyjudgments are seen as arbitrary and accusations
of corruption and other forms of undue influence are quickly circulated. See Frank
Emmert, The Independence ofJudges-A Concept Often Misunderstood in Central and Eastern
Europe, 4 EUR. L.J. 405, 405-09 (2002); Open Society Inst., JudicialIndependence in the EU
Accession Process (2001). These findings are also supported by the ABA's Central and
East European Law Initiative ("CEELI"), which has developed a judicial Reform Index
for a number of Central European Countries. See, e.g., CEELI, Judicial Reform Index for
Slovakia 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/jri/home.html
(June 2002).
82. See, e.g.,
Commission of the European Communities, Agenda 2000-Commission
Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union, DOC/97/12, at 13
(1997) available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/ag2000-opinions.
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sponse has been the organization of ever more training seminars
on EU law for civil servants, judges and prosecutors. However, as
I have written earlier, theoretical seminars, often conducted by
foreign lecturers with little or no familiarity with local circumstances, can only do so much towards real reform of administrative and court procedures.8 3 All too often, the seminars have
been offered in an unstructured manner or to an ever changing
group of participants. And, most definitely, there was no systematic benchmarking and assessment of successful learning.
In my own experience with seminars for civil servants,
judges, and prosecutors, anywhere between Romania and Estonia, I have typically found myself in front of a group of maybe
sixty participants. Ten to fifteen of those were obviously interested, had the required background knowledge and actively participated with sensible and even challenging questions. Another
ten to fifteen seemed interested but were too shy to participate
and would not volunteer answers when approached directly
(even where simultaneous interpretation was available). And
the remaining thirty to forty persons could best be described as
merely physically present, if at all, since they were also drifting in
and out or did not come back after coffee or lunch breaks. It
was pretty obvious that these people either did not want to be in
the seminar but had to attend, used the seminar as an excuse to
be absent from their office, or were completely unable to follow
for lack of linguistic skills or legal knowledge.
Twinning projects between authorities in CEECs and "old"
Member States could have been an answer to the weaknesses of
lecture-style seminars. However, typically the Central and Eastern European authorities were unable to send their most qualified staff for internships to the West for months at a time and,
similarly, when Western experts were visiting, they were rarely
able to stay long enough in order to understand the local institutional and regulatory setting in sufficient detail to be able to give
concrete advice. The Annual Conferences Between the Candidate Countries and the European Commission have also been
useful in bringing the experts together and providing a forum

htm, and the corresponding opinions about the other candidate countries. The progress reports of 2001 and 2002 have emphasized the problem in even clearer language.
83. See Emmert & Heinonen, supra note 74.
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for discussion of concrete issues, 8 4 but again, one two-day conference per year can hardly turn the tide.
I am sure that there were other activities of which I am unaware and I do not want to diminish the value of the work that is
being done. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that progress
has been too slow and that there is simply no way that the (competition) authorities and courts in the CEECs can be trusted to
dutifully apply the acquis communautaireby May 2004. Therefore,
preparations have to be changed in a qualitative manner and not
only intensified in a quantitative sense. And they have to be continued for years into membership. In this context we must also
remember that shortly after accession, considerable numbers of
the most qualified lawyers with training in EU law will move from
national capitals to Brussels. 5 This brain drain will not only
leave painful gaps at home, it will also be a problem for those
who go West, as they will not easily find contacts back home who
can provide qualified information and guidance for the best defense of national interests during negotiations in Brussels.
Therefore, training programs should be offered for at least two
or three persons for every person needed later.
In light of these observations, the reform of EU competition
enforcement sought by Regulation 1/2003 could hardly come at
a worse time. Many have expressed doubts regarding whether
the national authorities of the old Member States would be willing and able to safeguard competition in an adequate manner.8 6
84. The sixth such conference took place in Tallinn on September 25-26, 2000.
See Commission Press Release (Sept. 26, 2000). The seventh in Ljubljana onJune 18-19,
2001. Commission Press Release, IP/01/858 (June 19, 2001).
85. According to my own estimation, a small country like Estonia will send some
seventy-five A-level officials into the institutions within the first two years of membership. In addition, it seems that some 180 lawyer/linguists from each country, including
Estonia, will be required in the translation and interpretation services of the institutions.
86. For critical analysis of the Commission's proposals, see Jfirgen Basedow, Who
Will Protect Competition in Europe? From CentralEnforcement to Authority Networks and Private
Litigation, 2 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 443 (2001); Arved Deringer, Stellungnahme zum
Weilbuch der Europiischen Kommission fiber die Modernisierung der Vorschriften
zur Anwendung der Art. 85 und 86 EG-Vertrag (Art. 81 und 82 EG), 11 EuZW, No. 1, at
5-11 (2000); Claus Dieter Ehlermann, The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal
and CulturalRevolution, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 537 (2000); Damien Geradin, Competition Between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Proposed
Modernization of the Enforcement of EC Competition Law, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2002);
Ulrich Immenga, Eine Wende in der gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kartellpolitik, 10 EuZW,
No. 20, at 609 (1999); Emst-Joachim Mestmdcker, Versuch einer kartellpolitischen
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For the competition authorities in the CEECs, as they are joining
the EU, this, for the time being, is not even a question.8 7
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CEECS
Neither Article 49 of the TEU, in the interpretation given to
it by the Copenhagen Council in 1993, nor the White Paper or
the Agenda 2000, nor any other elements of the Pre-Accession
Strategy are giving specific instructions to the candidate countries on how they must design their competition authorities, the
structure and content of their national competition laws, or the
powers to be given to the administrative authorities and courts.
The information, which is available to CEECs on these issues is
either laconic or very general. It basically boils down to the requirement of being willing and able to effectively apply the acquis
communautaire. Similarly, comparative analysis of the institutional and substantial rules applicable in the "old" Member
States provides little guidance for CEECs.
Historically, the "old" Member States have had quite different approaches to competition supervision and the limitation of
EU competition law to those cases that have an impact on trade
between the Member States - rather than just on the market
within one Member State - has meant that the national structures, while losing "international" cases to the Commission, have
not been required to change in spite of internal market integration.
Consequently, the candidate countries de facto enjoy wide
discretion when it comes to the creation of national competition
authorities and their supervisory powers. However, the liberal
use of that discretion is neither historically necessitated nor in
the best interest of the CEECs. Scientific analysis and empirical
evidence clearly demonstrate a direct relationship between effecWende in der EU, 10 EuZW, No. 17, 523 et seq. (1999); Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, The
EC Commission's Modernizationof CompetitionPolicy: A Challenge to the Community's Constitutional Order, 1 EURO. Bus. ORG. L. REv., No. 3. For a defense of the proposals see, e.g.,
Andreas Geiger, Das WeiBbuch der EG-Kommission zu Art. 81, 82 EG - eine Reform,
besser als ihr Ruf, 11 EuZW, No. 6, 165-69 (2000).
87. This view is shared, in essence, by Ieva Azanda, From Ex Ante to Ex Post Enforcement of Article 81: Efficiency, Legal Certainty and Community Enlargement
(2003) (unpublished thesis, Concordia International University, Estonia) (on file with
author); Dovile Vaigauskaite, Implementation of the EC Competition Law in Lithuania:
Is the State Able to Apply the Acquis Effectively? (2002) (unpublished thesis, Concordia
International University, Estonia) (on file with author).
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tive protection of competition in the market on the one hand,
steady and sustainable development, general economic growth,
progress, and rising living standards for broad sections of the
population on the other. 88
In conclusion, I will try to make some suggestions regarding
how competition laws and authorities should be designed and implemented in CEECs to maximize their positive impact on economy and society.
1) National competition law should be concentrated in one single law of parliament. This law should contain the rules about
anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, concentrations, public undertakings, and anti-competitive State aids.8 9 It
should also contain all required provisions on the creation of a
competition authority, the procedures to be followed by this authority, and its powers of investigation and enforcement. Guidelines for the substantive range of such a law can be found by
looking at the combination of the manifold provisions of EU
competition law. Thus, the national competition law should also
include rules on individual and block exemptions, the block exemptions themselves, as well as all necessary information on the
definition of markets, calculation of turnover, de minimis and
rule of reason exceptions, etc. As part and parcel of such more
detailed rules, it would seem strongly advisable to incorporate
certain definitions and interpretations of terms as they have
been developed by the case law of the European Court of Justice
and the Commission. Finally, the national competition law
should provide for the powers of the national courts and for the
collaboration between the national authorities and courts and
the European Commission and Court ofJustice. In light of the
prevailing positivist traditions in Central and Eastern Europe
and in light of the fact that competition authorities regularly interfere with individual rights and commercial freedoms, the law
can hardly be too clear or too specific.
2) The national competition authority should be concentrated
into one single and coherent administrative unit. This body
should be completely independent and insulated from politically
motivated interference, separated organizationally and physi88. See SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW
(2d ed. 2002).
89. Rules on market-oriented and competitive procurement by the various State
authorities might also be included.
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cally from the respective ministries. Its mission should be the
balanced development of competition based on market forces.
For the achievement of this mission, it should be equipped with
sufficient resources and powers, including the power to defend
its prerogatives against interference by the executive or legislature.
3) The powers and obligations of the national courts in the area
of competition law and policy should be clearly spelled out in
the national law on competition. The courts must have full powers of review of implementing regulations and individual decisions adopted by the competition authority. They have to secure
the rights of individuals and undertakings, in particular when it
comes to safeguarding their procedural rights and the principle
of equality of arms. At the same time, the courts also have to
safeguard the independence of the competition authority and,
where necessary, assist in the enforcement of its decisions. In
light of the limited experience many courts in CEECs have with
effective review of administrative decisions and the application
of general principles of justice and due procedure, and with a
view to cumbersome and antiquated procedures in many places,
it would seem advisable to create a number of pilot courts where
younger and Western-trained judges participate on a voluntary
basis and receive special rights to experiment with new techniques of case-flow management, as well as formal and procedural simplifications.9 "
4) Since all CEECs find themselves at different stages but ultimately in the same process of development of national competition laws and authorities, it would also seem opportune to include in the national competition laws specific rules and procedures for the development of the network of public authorities
foreseen by Regulation 1/2003. The bilateral association agreements with the EU essentially established a hub-and-spine model
where the Commission alone had a good overview of the
problems encountered and solutions found in all candidate
countries. This kind of information now needs to be much
more broadly distributed and utilized via functioning networks
90. See Maria Dakolias & Javier Said, Judicial Reform: A Process of Change Through
Pilot Courts, 2 EUR.J. L. REFORM 95, 96-117 (2000) (detailing usefulness of pilot courts in
this context); see also Russell B. Sunshine, Technical Assistancefor Law Reform: Co-operative
Strategiesfor Enhancing Quality and Impact, 2 EUR. J. L. REFORM 61, 61-93 (2000); RUSSELL
B. SUNSHINE, MANAGING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - A PRAGrITIONER'S HANDBOOK (1995).
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of civil servants and judges dealing with competition law and policy. Regular opportunities for exchange of experiences can only
improve and speed up the learning process; furthermore, such
networks facilitate the exchange of information on markets and
the conduct of multinational enterprises.
5) With regard to education on competition law and policy,
there is first and foremost a need for high-quality textbooks on
EU competition law in Central and Eastern European languages.
In some countries, even basic textbooks on general EU law are
still not available in domestic languages. Good collections of
cases, particularly decisions of the Commission and rulings of
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, are hardly
available anywhere in the region. In economic terms, the reason
is market failure. Academics who have the necessary skills can
sell them for much higher reward in the consulting markets,
while such highly specialized books would sell only in very small
numbers. Hence, government intervention with subsidies would
be called for.
6) The need for training of large numbers of civil servants and
judges in EU law has been addressed so far by more or less structured seminars and workshops. I have often come across a perception that civil servants and judges have already had more
than enough lectures on general aspects of EU law and should
now be trained on highly specific questions of, for example, customs law, standard setting, comitology, etc. At the same time, I
have not met many civil servants or judges who had a sufficient
understanding of the practical impact of supremacy, direct effect, the preliminary reference procedure and the so-called
Francovich liability on their legal system and their own work.9 1
On the basis of these observations, I have concluded that training has been largely inefficient. Of course, most of those who
have participated in such seminars will be able to explain the
difference between the European Council and the Council of
Europe and how the European Commission and Parliament are
structured. But already when it comes to a true understanding
of the Cassis-de-Dijon principle and what it means for the free
movement of goods, the feedback is disappointing. What is really required, therefore, are rules about a systematic education
91. SeeJoined Cases 6 & 9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Republic of Italy, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-5357, 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993).
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to be taken by civil servants who are dealing with EU related matters and who want to rise to executive positions. This training
should begin with courses on the institutions, decision-making
procedures, and general principles of EU law, in particular
supremacy and direct effect. Attendance must be controlled and
comprehension must be monitored via class-room discussion
and oral and written examinations. On the second level, judges
and civil servants should learn about the internal market; on the
third level about legal remedies in the EU; and on the fourth
level about competition law and policy. Progression from one
level to the next should be conditional upon successful demonstration of skills in the examinations and all levels together
should amount to at least 200-250 hours of in-class instruction.
Last but not least, the instruction must preferably be done by
nationals of the respective country and in the national language,
as long as standards of quality can be ensured. Only when sufficient numbers of civil servants and judges have been trained in
such a manner, can we expect effective application of the acquis
communautaire,including the competition acquis, in the CEECs,
and if the bar associations would require, their members to participate as well, we could actually expect Central and Eastern Europe to get into gear for the full utilization of the great opportunities of the European integration process.
Last but not least, the old Member States would be well advised to consider similar training programs, as continuing education, for their civil servants, attorneys, and other legal professionals.

